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From Theory to Practice
Robert Mier and Kari J. Moe
his chapter is the story of our participation in the generation and im- 
plementation of a set of urban economic development policies that evolved 
in Chicago from the mid-1970s through 1987. The story follows our ideas 
and experiences through three stages: as policy analysts and activists in­
volved in community-based coalitions; as members of the policy apparatus 
of the Harold Washington mayoral campaign; and as administrators in city 
government. We have tried to reflect carefully about what we set out to-do, 
what we did, and what we learned.
Our course was inextricably rooted in the history of minority and com­
munity political struggles in Chicago, which we discuss in the first part of 
this chapter. Its direction was enabled and informed by the clear vision and 
legislative record of Harold Washington. He believed that politics and gov­
ernment could be a force for fairness, effective service delivery, and social 
programs directed toward the needs of neighborhoods. As community 
organizers and as urban planners, we believed that our role was to apply 
our best efforts to implement this vision, with strategies that had to include 
both democratic process and good results.
On a decision-by-decision basis, guided by Washington’s vision and 
commitment, we tried to address the desires of all neighborhoods for open, 
effective, and fair government. We worked to make their agenda a reality in 
both big and small ways. We changed budget priorities and implemented 
reform legislation that was dramatic for Chicago. But no detail was insig­
nificant. For example, we took care to personally rewrite letters that senior 
staff had prepared for the mayor’s signature to make them sound less bu­
reaucratic and more human. We also talked to secretaries about being 
“Harold’s voice” to the citizen who had perhaps never called city hall 
before.
Even with our best efforts, there is no denying the huge constraints we 
faced at every turn in the implementation process. Moe was fond of saying 
that trying to get things done was like fighting a war with someone else’s 
army. The idea that winning an election is a cakewalk compared to govern­
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ing was one that we grasped immediately. We were humbled by the extreme 
difficulty we encountered every single minute of every day in office.
Parallel Paths of Development
Our Personal Paths
We came to the Washington administration experience on paths that had 
intersected before. Moe came to Chicago in 1972 as a Carleton College 
student in the Associated Colleges of the Midwest Urban Studies Program. 
She returned in 1974 and until 1980 was employed as a social worker and 
teacher, while also working with several community-based organizations 
in the politically active Uptown community. [NB: In Chicago, Uptown 
(capitalized) is a distinct community area or neighborhood— unlike down­
town (lower case), the central business district.) Moe met Mier in 1976 
when she enrolled part-time in the School of Urban Planning and Policy 
(SUPP) at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC). She later completed a 
Masters of City Planning degree at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol­
ogy and returned to Chicago in 1982 to become executive director of the 
Community Workshop on Economic Development (CWED). She had 
broadened her focus on social welfare and youth policy issues to include 
community development, employment, and economic development.
Mier arrived in Chicago in 1975 to teach community development and 
planning at UIC. In the preceding decade he had served in Vietnam as an 
advisor to the South Vietnamese navy and then been actively involved in 
the antiwar and community development movements in Oakland, Calif, 
and St. Louis, Mo. He was the founding director in 1978 of the UIC Center 
for Urban Economic Development (UICUED). His teaching emphasis on 
community economic development, pedagogical emphasis on social action 
as a means of learning, and technical assistance activities at UICUED 
brought him into close working contact with a number of community de­
velopment organizations. He was a founding member of CWED, with 
whom he helped articulate a community development policy statement. 
Both authors joined Harold Washington’s administration in 1983.1
Earlier, in 1982, when we helped put together the Washington campaign 
economic development platform, several large and diverse neighborhood- 
based organizations and coalitions engaging in community economic de­
velopment had emerged. The organizations included housing and 
commercial develdfiment groups with a sprinkling of industrial develop­
ment ones.
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Community-based Organizations
Move into Economic Development
By 1975, several forces in Chicago had converged to catalyze a sharp­
ened discussion about economic development— in addition to housing—  
in community development. Community leaders were seeing more clearly 
the need to move beyond simple protest and to create jobs, promote skill 
training, and link people with jobs. As Gills has discussed earlier in this 
volume, formal and informal networks of community organizations were 
emerging to facilitate strategic discussions. A critical number of com­
munity development organizations existed by the latter half of the decade, 
and they frequently acted for a collective purpose through formal network 
organizations. Viable city wide organizations had been forming that would 
provide support and assistance to the local community organizations and 
networks.
The Chicago Rehab Network, as Gills has pointed out, was a group of 
community organization leaders who coalesced around their commitment 
to rehabilitate housing in low-income neighborhoods. More importantly, 
they focused on the limitations of housing as a single issue and were begin­
ning to explore broader community development approaches. Some of 
the Rehab Network groups were among the first to broaden their pur­
pose, considering a direct job generation approach to community develop­
ment. The Eighteenth Street Development Corporation, the Bickerdike 
Redevelopment Corporation, the Kenwood-Oakland Community Organ­
ization (KOCO), and the Midwest Community Council in particular began 
to explore job training in rehabilitation construction trades as well as 
direct business development.2
The Chicago Association of Neighborhood Development Organizations 
(CANDO), started in 1978, was another important community institu­
tion. Some of the advocacy groups in white working class neighborhoods 
earlier had taken up the issue of commercial revitalization. By 1978, there 
were about a dozen neighborhood commercial revitalization groups. Like 
the Rehab Network, they first came together as an informal network, then 
formally associated as CANDO.
In 1978 the graduate planning program at UIC formed the Center for 
Urban Economic Development (UICUED). UICUED became an important 
source of technical assistance to community development organizations.3 
By 1980, Mier and his colleagues in the planning program at UIC had 
graduated a number of people specializing in community economic devel­
opment. Many had joined the staffs of community organizations. Other 
support organizations included the Center for Neighborhood Technology 
(CNT), created in 1976. It worked within these networks of community 
organizations, trying to bring to them alternative production technologies. 
Their first venture was urban greenhouses for food production. Finally, the
DECENTRALIZED DEVELOPMENT 67
Associated Colleges of the Midwest Urban Studies Program proved to be
an im portant training ground for many individuals who participated in the
community organizing efforts.4
The downtown civic and philanthropic associations also increased their 
focus on housing and economic development issues in low-income com­
munities. There was evidence of this shift in the Urban League, Community 
Renewal Society, the Latino Institute, T.R.U.S.T., Inc., and the Jewish 
Council on Urban Affairs. In the late 1970s, led by the Wieboldt Founda­
tion, the foundations shifted some of their funding to actual development 
activities. Once Wieboldt moved, the Joyce Foundation, the Chicago Com­
munity Trust, the Woods Charitable Fund, and eventually the MacArthur 
Foundation, followed.
Downtown Planning Initiatives
During this same time, interests primarily concerned with the develop­
ment of Chicago’s central business district began to advocate or directly 
undertake development planning.5 These downtown planning initiatives 
were important for what they revealed about corporate interests. They 
also stimulated a creative response from the neighborhoods. The “down­
town vs. neighborhoods” metaphor would emerge in the Washington cam­
paign. The Chicago 21 Plan of the late 1970s was a catalyst that defined 
issues, interests, and relationships which endured into the Washington 
administration.6
The Chicago 21 Plan intended to shape development of a “central area” 
extending to Damen Avenue on the west, south to 35th Street, and north to 
North Avenue. These boundaries included several low-income com­
munities that had experienced substantial housing and commercial 
disinvestment. The plan envisioned those neighborhoods as extensions of 
the central area. To organizers and planners in those neighborhoods, it 
seemed as if the central area development advocates had a gentrification 
agenda. They began to raise questions and, through organizing efforts, 
formed a coalition against it.
The Chicago Central Area Committee (CCAC), the sponsors of die plan, 
responded by pledging matching planning grants to the affected neighbor­
hoods. The CCAC sought input on the neighborhood components of its 
plan, with a pledge to incorporate them. Although there was concern 
about co-optation, two of the four communities raised matching funds and 
undertook community plans. One was done in Pilsen by die Pilsen Neigh­
bors Community Council with Pat Wright, a SUPP graduate, as its planner. 
The other was done in West Town, where the Northwest Community Or­
ganization (NCO) spun off a planning group led by another of Mier’s 
former students, Maureen Hell wig.
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The planning grants may have played a co-optation role to the extent 
that these two groups began to focus on an agenda for their respective 
neighborhoods and diverted their focus from the overall approach of the 
Chicago 21 Plan. But the community planning processes also involved 
more people and organizations within each neighborhood in die debate 
about the future of their neighborhood.7 Residents could not visualize their 
neighborhood becoming an extension of the Loop without being gen- 
trified. Gentrification became the organizing issue for the Coalition to Stop 
the Chicago 21 Plan.
Other events in these communities helped keep the issue of gentrification 
alive. For example, in Pilsen at that time, local developer John Podmajersky 
promoted a grandiose plan for renovating the historic Schoenhoffen Brew­
ery as an upscale boutique development to be called Bathhouse Square. 
In addition, small colonies of artists emerged both in Pilsen and in West 
Town. Local groups perceived such artists’ colonies as beachheads for 
gentrification.8
Issues similar to those provoked by the Chicago 21 Plan were emerging 
in other neighborhoods. For example, a major low-income housing dis­
placement batde was being fought in Uptown in the late 1970s. On die 
West Side, there was community conflict over the operations of a major 
hospital complex. People with specific experiences in their own neighbor­
hood found common cause with people in other neighborhoods: whites on 
the north side, Hispanics in West Town and Pilsen, and blacks on the West 
Side were experiencing the same organizing challenges and beginning to 
speak a common language of experience.9
During this time period, a parallel set of community-based organizations 
and networks developed around health, human services, and education 
issues. These organizations were similar to the development organizations 
in their philosophy, personnel, and networking, and in the way they visu­
alized downtown impart on the neighborhoods. The Alternative Schools 
Network, within which Moe worked from 1977 to 1980, was a parallel 
organization to the Rehab Network. In a lot of individual neighborhoods, 
the local alternative school worked directly with the local housing develop­
ment group to train young people in carpentry. Where Moe worked in 
Uptown, her students trained at The Voice of the People, the local housing 
rehabilitation group. This represented one example of the multiple kinds of 
cross fertilization going on within and among neighborhoods.
Business Alienation
A second countervailing force evolved through the 1970s. Businesses lo­
cated out of the central area felt ignored by city hall. This stimulated the
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formation of local chambers of commerce, business development groups, 
industrial councils, and eventually the CANDO network. In 1977, Mier 
and some of his students worked with the Economic Development Com­
mission (EDC) doing a survey of manufacturing firms in the Pilsen-Little 
Village area.10 These firms were very disenchanted with city hall. This 
dissatisfaction led to their creation of the Pilsen Industrial Council. 
This council began to work with the Eighteenth Street Develop­
ment Corporation. This networking between businessmen’s groups and 
local constituency-based development groups was occurring in many 
neighborhoods.
Minority Political Empowerment
A third countervailing force also emerged beginning in the 1960s— that 
of increased independence and assertiveness within Chicago's black com­
munity. This history of rising minority dissatisfaction is well documented 
earlier in this volume by Gills. This movement was reinforced by the steady 
growth of Chicago’s population of blacks and other minorities, and the ver­
ification of that growth in the 1980 census. This occurred in the national 
context of dramatic increases in the numbers of minority-group mayors 
throughout the country.11 Finally, contributing to all of this concern and 
protest was the cutback of social programs under the Reagan presidency as 
well as its overt attack on civil rights policies.
The Paths Converge: 1982
Formation o f the Community Workshop 
on Economic Development
The Community Workshop on Economic Development (CWED) 
emerged from a 1982 conference sponsored by the Community Renewal 
Society (CRS) to critique enterprise zones, the central Republican urban 
development initiative, and to focus the local urban development policy 
debate.12 The participating community organizations were frustrated with 
President Reagan’s budget cutbacks and the dismantling of urban pro­
grams. In addition, the specter of a World’s Fair in Chicago loomed, an 
event threatening to absorb for the next decade all available discretionary 
public developmenfiresources. But they also understood that the times re­
quired strategies that moved beyond statements of opposition to enterprise
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zones and the World’s Fair. The groups decided to coalesce in order to pre­
pare a proactive policy and program statement which could undergrid 
their fight for dollars and their critique of programs at the city and state 
levels. They also wanted a statement that would reflect the experience they 
had been gaining over several years of delivering community development 
projects.
The Chicago participants felt a sense, early on, that there was an oppor­
tunity, given a hotly contested governor’s race underway in Illinois, to 
produce a significant statewide policy statement. The state also became the 
focus because Reagan was transferring the control of significant urban de­
velopment programs from the federal government to the states. State 
governments would be designating enterprise zones. This launched die ef­
fort to put together CWED as a statewide organization.13 CWED’s 
formation was an acknowledgement that it was time for community based 
organizations to get political at the state level and represented an aware­
ness of common interests with similar groups in smaller cities.
The actual CWED policy statement, a codification erf the decisions of 
two statewide meetings, was written in August 1982. The platform was 
subsequendy modified based on feedback from CWED members and then 
ratified. At the time of its drafting, the significance of the policy-defining 
effort was not fully appreciated. In fact, it failed in terms of being a political 
organizing device to influence die governor’s race because it was completed 
too late.
By November CWED was in transition. It had started as an ad hoc, short 
term effort. There was a decision by the Chicago members to continue the 
organization as the Chicago Workshop on Economic Development be­
cause of their belief that an advocacy organization focusing on develop­
ment policy was essential.14
Harold Washington Decides to Run for Mayor
Chicago’s black community was alive with political activity during the 
summer and fall of 1982. Operation PUSH was leading a boycott of 
Chicagofest, and Chicago Black United Communities (CBUC) sponsored a 
straw poll to identify leading black candidates for mayor.15 The census 
data revealed that the mayoralty was in reach. The traditional powers erf die 
machine wanted to defeat Jane Byrne by supporting Richard M . Daley, son 
of the former mayor. Ed Gardner, owner of Soft Sheen Products, supported 
a voter registration drive called “Come Alive, October 5 .” Harold Wash­
ington, clearly the favored candidate of the black community, said he 
would run if the registration challenge he established was achieved. Finally, 
as Gills has discussed, with Washington’s agreement to run, many com­
DECENTRALIZED DEVELOPMENT 71
munity organizations like PUSH and CBUC coalesced, for die sake of the 
campaign, into the Task Force on Black Political Empowerment.
Campaign Issues Development
Moe received a call from Hal Baron in early November 1982. Congress­
man Washington had asked Baron to cochair, with Vince Bakeman, his 
Research and Issues Committee for the campaign. Baron asked Moe to be 
the staff director of the Research and Issues Committee, should Wash­
ington ultimately decide to run.16 By November 15, Washington had made 
his decision and had approved Moe’s hiring, and Moe left CWED for the 
campaign.
In the second half of November, Baron wrote a memo to Washington 
suggesting alternative approaches to issues development. His favored sug­
gestion was the formation of issues teams to bring together diverse 
viewpoints and constituencies and to produce a popularly generated plat­
form. The second, more traditional alternative was to assemble a few 
“experts” for a short, intensive effort to shape the campaign issues. Baron 
suggested to Washington that he would probably end up with the same 
policy papers, but the first approach would develop constituencies. 
Washington chose the broad-based issues teams approach. Baron, 
Bakeman, and Moe started to organize the teams in late November and 
early December. Each issue team was to represent the class, race, and 
neighborhood diversity of the city.
Washington’s approach to issues development for the campaign was sig­
nificant in that it later characterized his approach to issues development in 
government. The approach also reflected his tendency as a legislator to 
“hear all views” and replicated the committee structure of his congres­
sional district.
By early January, about fifteen issues teams had started working on 
topics inducting energy, housing, jobs, senior dtizens, women, fiscal policy, 
transportation, neighborhoods, and economic development (which was 
chaired by Mier). Washington appointed an oversight body, the Research 
and Issues Committee, to report to him regarding policy directions and to 
advise him routinely regarding work progress and schedule. Each issues 
team produced policy papers, spedfic briefing papers for speeches, en­
dorsement sessions and debates, and campaign literature. The policy 
papers were published in the central policy document of the campaign, The 
Washington Papers.'7
We are still impressed by die incredible energy and effort put forth by the 
more than 150 volunteers on these issues teams. On their own initiative, 
they gathered documents, conducted interviews, held substantive debates
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at their meetings, and worked under extremely tight deadlines to produce 
written documents for the campaign. In addition, the campaign Research 
Office coordinated another ten to fifteen volunteers per day who prepared 
the candidate’s daily briefing packets for all his scheduled events. Along 
with every other aspect of the campaign operation, the core staff worked 
fourteen hours per day, seven days per week, from December to April. Re­
sources were so sparse that there frequently were not enough chairs for all 
the people who wanted to work.
Given all that had to be done for his campaign, Washington must be 
credited for allocating resources, talent, time, and status to the issues oper­
ation. He remained committed to a campaign of substance, even though 
often not covered by the media. He carried this concern for issues into city 
government.
The Campaign Trail
On the actual campaign trail, Harold Washington consistently tran­
scended his written material. He embellished his briefing notes with 
history and a rich rhetorical flourish. The fact that Harold Washington was 
able to elevate issues in the campaign provides an important insight into his 
history. This point is particularly significant because of the way in which 
the mainstream media and the political opposition characterized him as an 
exciting orator but not a serious or substantive candidate. They ignored 
and misunderstood the content of his speeches.
Important dimensions of Harold Washington’s personal history, such as 
his political learning within the Daley machine, his break in the late 1960s, 
and his successful resistance to machine attempts at his political annihila­
tion, are well known.18 Less well recognized by the general public at the 
time of his campaign was the quality of his record as an elected official.
He had always been, even as a regular Democrat, a strong issues politi­
cian. His state legislative record of accomplishments included currency 
exchange reform, education, promotion of minority and female business 
participation in government contracting (M/FBE), the Martin Luther King 
holiday, and funding for minority-owned and operated Provident Hospital 
on Chicago’s South Side. His expertise on each issue was broad and deep in 
a way surpassed by few state elected officials. He maintained this pattern in 
the U.S. Congress, where he continued to score consistently high ratings 
from labor, women’s organizations, and good government groups. He or­
ganized a variety of citizen-staffed issues committees in his congressional 
district. In a short time as a congressman, he became one of the leading 
spokespersons for the Voting Rights Act renewal.19
This record had not escaped the black community. In their eyes, he had
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become a powerful symbol. He represented, at once, liberation, strength of 
convictions, achievement against the odds, and substance. He was seen as a 
giant intellect who possessed the humility and common sense to stay in 
close contact with his constituency. He was respected as a leader who could 
lead and listen. He was seen not only as a charismatic orator but as an 
elected official with a pragmatic, grounded agenda.
As a candidate, Harold Washington had a rare ability to integrate the 
emotional, political, and content aspects of all issues and to relate to any 
audience with whom he was talking. One of Moe’s typical daily experi­
ences when traveling with him in his car to brief him during tine 1983 
general election was going from the West Side El (elevated railroad) stops 
to the top floor of the First National Bank building to talk to bankers. Then 
they went to the North Side to discuss human rights with a predominantly 
gay audience, then to South Side housing projects, then to the steel mills in 
southeast Chicago, and finally back to West Town to meet with Puerto 
Rican businessmen. There wasn’t an audience that he didn’t move. He 
molded each issue into a message that connected with the disenchantment 
and desire for leadership of these diverse audiences.
The Transition Team
After the primary victory in February 1983, the base of support needed 
to be broadened. Because it was too late for significant additions to the 
campaign steering or issues committees, Washington needed other vehicles 
to involve additional supporters. In addition, it was time to establish his 
ability to work with the broader networks that would be required in order 
for him to govern after the April general election and inauguration. In 
Mardi 1983, he launched a Transition Committee, cochaired by Bill 
Berry, former longtime director erf the Chicago Urban League, and James 
O’Connor, chairman of Commonwealth Edison. There was an Oversight 
Committee, dominated by chief executive officers of Chicago corporations, 
but it also included substantial community representation, a fact that was 
to become a Washington trademark. Sixteen individual issues teams were 
established, paralleling the structure of the campaign issues committees.
While the structure of the transition team was similar to the campaign 
issues structure, and in some cases membership overlapped, many actors 
were included who changed the nature of the committee debate. As Gills 
discussed earlier, many of these debates foreshadowed subsequent discus­
sions and controversies in the administration between varying interest 
groups.
Some of the teams? most notably economic development, were used by 
business leadership to advocate a particular policy position. In a pattern
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common to virtually every major city that had elected a minority-group 
mayor, the business leadership began a campaign to move the public devel­
opment functions from under the control of the mayor into a quasi-public 
development corporation. They argued that this would provide develop­
ment with "immunity from politics,” but it was in fact a much deeper 
struggle over the control of development priorities and resources.20
In addition to generating policy recommendations, the staff of each 
Transition Issues Committee went to the city departments during April 
and May 1983, to conduct interviews and collect documents. The Wash­
ington team wanted to have as much information as possible. The final 
transition report was released to the public in September 1983. The recom­
mendations of the Washington Papers and the transition report 
subsequently served as an explicit reference point for the administration’s 
review of its progress up through the 1987 election.21
Taking Over and Starting Up
With the election victory, many of Harold Washington’s supporters from 
tihe community and economic development networks and organizations—  
like us— began to think erf taking roles in the new administration. To each 
of us, working for Harold Washington was an opportunity to implement 
the campaign agenda. It was clear that Moe was moving horn the car into 
the Mayor’s Office. From the transition experience, the importance of get­
ting someone who was committed to community-oriented development 
policies appointed commissioner of economic development was clear. In 
the month after the election, Mier decided to make a push for it. Even­
tually, seven members of the economic development issues group would 
join the administration.22
Reflections on What Lay Before Us
Until the time we joined the city administration, we were both “out­
siders” to local government, with our feet firmly rooted in community 
work. We knew the transition from outside to inside was significant, but it 
was not possible at the time to anticipate all of the consequences. We vowed 
not to become “bureaucrats.” Contemplating the choice to join Mayor 
Harold Washington in government service, we attempted to be explicit 
about the major issues and our values and understandings toward them.23
A lot of this was a matter of the way we viewed local government. We
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thought several local government functions presented both opportunities 
and constraints in the achievement of our objectives.24 One such function 
of die local government was service provision. Ws recognized we had little 
ability to impact the larger economy but were optimistic about our ability 
to improve the basic quality and distribution of service. We realized that the 
credibility of Harold Washington’s ability to govern rested on his ability to 
deliver such things as garbage pickup and snow removal, and to deliver 
them fairly. Of course, basic economic development services were included 
in this calculus.
We also believed that local government, by virtue of its proximity to local 
residents, provided the potential to be a laboratory of democracy wherein 
city residents who had been alienated from government could experience a 
different relationship with it. We believed this could be done through free­
dom of information policies, community forums, citizen task forces, or 
major speeches. We wanted to raise the local citizenry’s expectations and 
have them set a standard to which they would hold the administrators ac­
countable. With Chicago’s history of having a dominant mayor who could 
command media, corporate, and business attention, we thought that 
Mayor Washington had a unique opportunity to influence the terms of the 
public policy debate at the local, state, and national levels.
We recognized the tendency of government to co-opt challenging social 
movements as a way of maintaining consent for die basic structures of so­
ciety. We knew there was the danger that we might defuse the community 
actions that brought the mayor into office. We saw the opportunity, on the 
other hand, to use the co-optive power of government to broaden the base 
of support, both within and outside of government, for our goals. Thus, 
while we believed that local government was, more often than not, ex­
ploited by its relationship to "growth coalitions,” we believed that we 
could alter this relationship through “public return on public investment” 
policies, like betting on basic industry.25 We thought these policies would 
have a longer term impact on the macroeconomy. We wanted to test the 
ability of local government to enlist the growth coalition's support for a 
broader public policy agenda.
We also had a social issue agenda. We believed that the two central social 
issues before us were poverty and race relations. We knew that local govern­
ment, especially in Illinois, where the welfare system is essentially state 
managed, had only a limited capacity to address poverty. Notwithstand­
ing, we felt that we would have to keep the issue of poverty at the forefront 
of everything we would undertake. Similarly, we knew the racial divisive­
ness within Chicago would face us every day, even Within the ranks of the 
Harold Washington coalition. But we believed that local government, be­
cause of its closeness to people's lives, played an important role in 
mediating social relations across race, class, and neighborhood lines. We
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believed that, by bringing people of diverse backgrounds and perspectives 
together, local government could promote at least understanding and per­
haps decreased hostility among different interest groups. We were unsure 
about the ability of local government to develop consensus, except on a 
personal, issue-specific basis.
We hoped to bring our personal commitments to social justice into the 
government and to make it operational in our day-to-day decision making. 
In this regard, following the theories of John Rawls and the practice of 
Norman Krumholz, we hoped to be able to focus attention on the least 
advantaged in any public decision making situation and to give their cir­
cumstances priority attention.26 We also thought that an economic 
development agenda that opened job opportunities to the most work- 
needy Chicagoans was a major means of achieving justice.
In addressing the issues of poverty and race, we knew that neighborhood- 
based organizations were a needed ally.27 We anticipated actively opening 
government decision processes to wide public participation. We believed 
that neighborhood organizations could be supportive of a broader social 
justice agenda, beyond their individual neighborhood concerns. To do this, 
we anticipated that much of the informal networking in which we had en­
gaged as activists would still play an important role.
Economic Development:
From Activism to Administration
The Department of Economic Development (DED) was an essential de­
partment to control. Although it had a relatively modest budget of $35 
million, it had important legal authority and it carried out community de­
velopment functions that could be significantly enhanced. It was a central 
department for reaching the mayor’s neighborhood and small business 
constituencies. DED was a platform from which to set the terms of the eco­
nomic development debate. For example, the Playskool plant closing case 
of 1984 dramatized a new direction for government—business relations 
that had national impact.28 A paradox of DED’s role was its limited spend­
ing authority vs. its significant “setting the terms of the debate” authority.
There were a number of objectives we started with that were based upon 
our experience, the Washington Papers, the transition report, and the 
mayor’s leadership:
1. Direct Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and 
infrastructure funds to support neighborhood development. This 
objective was central to Mayor Washington’s priority of 
neighborhood revitalization. The need for these program dollars
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was obvious, especially in minority areas that had been traditionally 
neglected. M ayor Byrne’s concentration of CDBG funds and 
infrastructure programs on downtown projects and favored wards 
had been the subject of community protest.
2. Enhance business retention programs focusing on sm all- to 
m edium sized businesses constituting the bulk o f  Chicago’s 
employment base. In this regard, we envisioned community 
development and businessmen’s groups as a potential first point of 
contact with the more than 100,000 businesses scattered throughout 
Chicago.
3. Develop and implement an overall program that is sensitive to 
the idiosyncracies o f particular econom ic sectors and can identify 
and seize strategic opportunities. This challenge required 
understanding the enormous diversity of Chicago’s local economy 
and recognizing that city government, with limited resources, had to 
invest carefully. We believed that we would find low-cost, high-return 
projects by looking within specific sectors such as the steel industry.
4. Increase the participation o f  sm all and minority-oumed 
businesses in city loan and procurement programs. These programs 
had been structured to favor large businesses or contractors, making 
it difficult for the vast majority of Chicago businesses to either get 
help or do business with the city. One consequence, for example, 
was that more than 60 percent of the City’s $400 million annual 
purchase of goods and services was going to non-Chicago suppliers, 
thus resulting in the loss of a significant opportunity to stimulate 
local job generation.
5. Advocate an urban agenda at the state and national levels.
Given his rich experience in the state legislature and Congress, the 
historic political strength of the Chicago mayor’s office, and a 
national leadership vacuum on urban issues, Mayor Washington felt 
that he could play a role in focusing public attention on such issues 
as housing for low-income and homeless people or jobs and training 
for the work needy.
6. Better coordinate econom ic development, employment and 
training, and education efforts. Our goal was to change die public 
perception that training programs were little more than disguised 
welfare and to make training and education central to business 
development. Beyond that, the goal was for the mayor to focus on 
die education bureaucracy, relating education to development. This 
objective, although certainly as pressing as all the others in the early 
debate, was overwhelmed by the day-to-day realities and did not 
surface as a strong agenda item until Mayor Washington’s second 
term.29
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7. Improve government operations. We knew that little attention
had been paid to fundamental facets of management such as the
development of personnel and information systems. We sought to
modernize operations.
The overarching goal of all these objectives was the need to provide jobs 
for Chicagoans needing work. As a result of the virtual hemorrhage of the 
city’s manufacturing base during the 1960s and 1970s, combined with the 
severe recession of the early 1980s, Chicago’s unemployment rate exceeded 
12 percent— with a substantial concentration among minorities in general 
and minority youth in particular. We knew that there were substantial 
limits to the impact a local government could have on that, but were deter­
mined to gauge everything we did by the standard of providing jobs for 
work-needy people.
Assessing the Department
Virtually all the departments in the government inherited by Harold 
Washington operated as if they were part of a 1950s organization. For ex­
ample, there were no computers in DED when we walked in. None of the 
financial staff was using electronic spreadsheets; everything was being 
done by hand. Department staff were calling on 3000 businesses a year 
with paper records that were virtually inaccessible. This backwardness 
held for all city government systems, as diverse as the personnel system and 
the check-writing system.
DED was a young organization, having been created in 1982. It suc­
ceeded the Economic Development Commission, which then had been 
vested with some line authority. The new department was created by 
adding some units from the Departments of Planning and Neighborhoods 
to those in the Economic Development Commission.30
When Mier started, a large amount of DED’s $35 million budget was for 
infrastructure development. The city had received counterrecession federal 
Economic Development Administration (EDA) funds, so it was rebuilding 
industrial streets and undertaking some commercial area improvements. 
DED also had a $1 million EDA revolving loan fund and was packaging 
federal Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs). There was a business 
contact program with ten or twelve people in the field knocking on doors. 
DED supported chambers of commerce to implement marketing programs 
for their neighborhood commercial strips. There were about thirty- 
five community business organizations annually receiving about $1 mil­
lion in grants. A staff of about ten people managed the commercial strip 
program.
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DED lacked a clear mission and identity, partly owing to its newness.
There was no marketing program. There was no program designed to pro­
vide comprehensive services to small businesses. There was only a limited 
industrial policy focus.31
While DED lacked a clear mission, it had an organizational culture. This 
departmental culture accepted that significant projects went through an es­
sentially political decision process. Favored nongovernmental deal brokers 
handled the major projects or programs. Therefore, the department staff 
was relegated to less significant work.
Staff accepted that they didn’t have the resources or authority to commit 
the bureaucracy. This paradox fostered an individual behavior, on the one 
hand, of trying to sound responsive while, on the other, not being able to 
deliver. Bureaucratic procedures existed to shove away problems while pre­
tending to take them seriously. If anything, this problem was exacerbated 
with the election of Harold Washington. His campaign promise to make 
government accessible to everyone had raised expectations. The scarcity of 
resources and the overwhelming nature of many problems lead to enor­
mous “queuing” problems.
Another problematic aspect of organization culture was a serious lack of 
information and knowledge across departmental divisions. For example, 
there were about ten people who contacted businesses through field calls. 
These ten people had received no training regarding the loan programs of 
the department. If a business person wanted financial assistance, he or she 
couldn’t find out about it from the DED agents who were the first point of 
information. The business person had to go through the deal brokers. We 
identified several similar problems in this early analysis.
Organizing the Department
Mier took office in August 1983. By mid-October, several division heads 
who were sensitive to and capable of managing the Harold Washington 
agenda were in place.32 But Mier was still troubled by the presence of many 
staff people who were set in their ways. These staff ranged from apolitical 
bureaucrats who had been stuck in a job for years to political appointees 
who were allied with the mayor’s opposition. The consequences of this in­
cluded low productivity, bad morale, and— in the worse cases— sabotage.
We knew that changing organizational culture and staff behavior 
throughout DED would take two to three years. This was too long a time 
frame to achieve organizational effectiveness. We wanted the ability, at a 
moment’s notice, toHseize opportunities to implement concrete projects 
that embodied the Washington agenda.
In order to provide a stimulus for innovation and to keep a focus on
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larger strategy questions, Mier formulated the idea of a new Research and 
Development (R8cD) Division within DED. In November, 1983, we 
drafted the functions of the division. It would provide staff resources to line 
divisions when they engaged in entrepreneurial activities, work with com­
munity based organizations engaged in policy research and development, 
improve information systems within the department, and manage special 
projects. Hie R&D Division, described more fully later in this volume in 
Giloth’s chapter, was launched in January 1984, when Moe transferred to 
DED from the Mayor’s Office.
Redefining Culture
With his key managers in place, Mier knew that he needed to foster a 
different organizational culture. The components of the desired culture 
were in some cases linked directly to the mayoral campaign. One theme 
was respect for the processes of community empowerment. This required 
creating a different attitude in the bureaucracy, one that respected and re­
sponded to external initiative instead of being exclusively internally driven, 
or driven by the political apparatus.
Consistent with themes of openness and democracy, he wanted to mini­
mize bureaucratic boundaries and to create a climate of problem solving 
based on point to point communication and teamwork. Mier recognized 
and rewarded this kind of initiative. This discomforted the division heads, 
even ones he had appointed. Like Washington, Mier would symbolically 
reinforce his emphasis on point-to-point communication by doing it 
himself.
A major obstacle, which cannot be overemphasized, impeding the crea­
tion of a different culture was the predominant administrative rules and 
norms of the bureaucracy. DED was subject to personnel regulations, hir­
ing rules, and fiscal control systems that slowed everything down and 
frustrated employee morale significantly. In spite of this context, we also 
promoted culture change through traditional, formal approaches. We im­
plemented orientation and training sessions for the staff regarding the new 
directions of the department. We revised operational procedures, empha­
sizing the need for openness and accessibility. Vk symbolically reinforced 
these actions with, for example, new marketing paraphernalia. Over time, 
we underscored all this by introducing performance evaluations and tying 
them to achievement of our departmental objectives.
Within months we began to have quarterly all-department meetings, 
where Mier would reward people for actions that best exemplified the new 
goals. When someone undertook an initiative supportive of the new direc­
tions, he would share the episode with the entire department, emphasizing
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how it fit into the big picture, and then reward the employee with office 
memorabilia such as calling card cases or pen sets. High performers were 
also promoted whenever possible.
We placed a strong emphasis on the goal of equal opportunity. We were 
probably one of the earliest departments that made substantial inroads 
into equal employment opportunity (EEO) hiring. A key was Mier’s per­
sonal involvement. He wouldn’t let people hire unless he was satisfied 
that they had really done an EEO search. Moe developed the departmental 
procedures for such a search. Mier set goals for divisions, sections of divi­
sions, and occupational hierarchies. When the Latino Commission did 
an evaluation of departments’ EEO hiring efforts, they acknowledged DED 
as an model for other departments in terms of pursuing an EEO hiring 
program.33
Part of what we were doing was along the classical lines of good govern­
ment reform— creating an organization that was responsible to the mayor, 
yet operating along lines that were clear and accountable to the public.34 
Mayor Washington wanted the departments to be accessible to the public 
and to constituencies directly, as distinct from having citizens go through 
their city council representatives (aldermen) or consultants. For example, 
Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation, John Halpin made himself avail­
able directly to community groups so they could get their streets cleaned by 
talking to him directly.
As soon as Mier started in August 1983, then Chief of Staff Bill Ware 
asked him to form a subcabinet of commissioners from the development 
departments. Two were carryovers—Tom Kapsalis of Aviation and Jerry 
Butler of Public Works. The majority were Washington appointees: Brenda 
Gaines, Housing; Liz Hollander, Planning; Maria Cerda, MET (the 
Mayor’s Office of Employment and Training); and Fred Fine, Cultural 
Affairs. Common to all of them was minimal or no involvement in the cam­
paign. They were professionals in their fields.
The development subcabinet was the first such grouping established in 
the government. The mayor wanted a forum for information transfer both 
up and down through the hierarchy, as well as a forum for policy debate 
and coordination of programs and projects. He did not want department 
heads running their operations as fiefdoms, which had too often occurred 
in the past.
Mier had a large task on his hands and recruited Moe to staff the devel­
opment subcabinet even prior to her joining the department. The early 
meetings consisted of gathering information, defining an agenda, and at­
tempting to get all the commissioners on board with The Washington 
Papers. The subcabinet became focused when we undertook production of 
“Chicago Works Together: The 1984 Development Plan” (CWT).
The effort began when Mier woke up one morning in January to hear on
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the news that the mayor had announced the release of his development plan 
in about sixty days. So Mier walked into Washington’s office that morning 
and asked, “What’s this development plan you were talking about?“ The 
mayor quietly beamed with the smile he wore when he was about to ask for 
something impossible with the complete confidence it would somehow get 
done. He said, “1 figured you’d fill in the blanks.” We had sixty days to 
produce a development plan.
We met his goal with the highly acclaimed plan.35 CWT was a policy 
plan that laid out five broad goals (job development, neighborhood devel­
opment, balanced growth, efficiency, and a state legislative commitment) 
that set the framework for more than 45 specific policies. Finally, die 
policies were to be implemented with more than 200 specific projects.
The R& D  Division of DED was by then directed by Moe, and in the 
course of preparing the development plan she emerged as the chief of staff 
for the development subcabinet. All the departments contributed staff to 
support the effort, and it turned out to be a great device to motivate the rest 
of the departments in the development cluster. Because the matters of the 
development subcabinet closely involved DED, they served to reinforce the 
goals and directions of the department. With the completion of die devel­
opment plan, it was reasonable to expect a clearer sense of purpose and 
more pointed output from DED.
Managing DED Programs
Once the policy agenda was set, we were faced with the task of imple­
mentation. By the spring of 1984, DED had been reorganized into five 
operating divisions: business services, neighborhood development, real es­
tate development, international business development, and R&D. These 
divisions together were responsible for managing a wide variety erf pro­
grams and projects.
Within each of these divisions we faced a number of common problems. 
Staff capacity was limited, and the bureaucracy continued to move too 
slowly. We had too little money for everything, from computers and books 
to loan program dollars. We faced intransigent historical and institutional 
obstacles, such as trying to initiate development planning in neighbor­
hoods where no new development had occurred for several years. We 
experienced covert and overt political opposition within our ranks. The 
media was uninformed, hostile, and disinclined to cover neighborhood de­
velopment stories. Finally, we experienced disagreements about strategic 
directions. Any two or three of these factors operating at once would make 
management in any organization challenging. All six together made it ex­
tremely difficult.
Each division and its programs could be the object of considerable analy­
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sis and evaluation. Instead of focusing on all of them, we will highlight one 
program area: neighborhood development through community-based or­
ganizations, as this was central to the Washington development agenda. 
One division had major responsibility for this program area, but it touched 
the work of all the operating divisions. In addition, we will describe a num­
ber of large projects that we managed during the second half of the mayor’s 
tenure.
Neighborhood Development Program
In 1983, DED supported 35 community based business development 
organizations, known to the bureaucracy as “delegate agencies.” They 
provided a variety of services in their local neighborhood. This arrange­
ment was politically controversial because in some respects it circumvented 
the political ward organizations. It was also a system that put Washington 
directly in touch with his grass-roots constituency, which was also why pre­
vious mayors supported the concept to some degree.
Up until 1983 there was little oversight of the delegate agency program. 
The thirty five groups receiving money were subject to few requirements, 
although some were performing quite admirably. To the extent there was 
an evaluation system, it was superficial. Funding was based on a three- 
year cycle, at which point the departments wished groups to be “self- 
sufficient.” In reality, the criteria were unclear and few groups were ever 
defunded.
Based on campaign commitments and our philosophy of neighborhood 
development, we wanted to expand and improve the delegate agency pro­
gram. We wanted to demonstrate that development services could be 
effectively delivered through community-based organizations. Within two 
years, the number of neighborhood-based organizations or citywide 
groups supporting the neighborhood effort receiving direct funding from 
DED had grown to more than 100.
The expansion involved four types of groups. First, there were new local 
businessmen’s organizations being created, often encouraged by one of the 
major network organizations like CANDO or OWED. Second, there were 
groups in other functional areas, most often housing rehabilitation, who 
were broadening their work to include direct business assistance or devel­
opment. Third, there were particular efforts to encourage business 
organization development in low-income areas such as within public hous­
ing projects. Finally, there were service groups brought in to provide 
technical assistance to new or growing neighborhood based organizations. 
For example, the LcStgue of Women Voters received a DED grant to conduct 
board training.
DED rewarded groups that developed business service capacity both by
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giving them more money and letting them carry on a greater load of the 
work. When they evolved to what DED considered the most complete stage 
of development, they were given twice the amount of money any group hdd 
been given in the past. DED staff were then pulled out of that community. 
The local organization would become the city’s first line of contact with 
businesses outside of the central area. This final stage of development was 
called the Local Industrial Retention Initiative (LIRI).36
The LIRI program originated in the field operations division of DED, 
run by Arturo Vazquez. It evolved from an identification of the half dozen 
local industrial councils or community organizations among those rou­
tinely working with DED that had the highest organizational capacity to 
step up their industrial retention efforts. DED and these groups tried to 
formulate a systematic and strategic methodology for dealing with indus­
trial retention: what businesses should be approached; what should they 
be asked; what could be done to give them more confidence in the city; and, 
most importantly, what concrete problems could the city realistically 
tackle?
In varying degrees, other departments of the city that worked with 
neighborhood-based organizations were trying the same thing. The 
Department of Housing was supporting groups to rehabilitate housing for 
low- to moderate-income tenants. The Department of Human Services 
supported neighborhood-based social service providers. The Departments 
of Health and of Aging and Disability and the Mayor’s Office of Employ­
ment and Training similarly were developing networks of neighborhood 
based service providers.
Evaluation o f the Neighborhood Development Program
The program of support to more than 100 community development or­
ganizations made programmatic sense, policy sense, and political sense. 
But is was always a very tough program to manage because of the varying 
levels of capacity and performance from the groups.
Performance evaluation was very difficult and labor intensive. It exposed 
the uneven skills of our staff and their varying capacity to assist the groups 
and assess their performance. We needed an evaluation system that could 
minimize the risk associated with widely divergent groups and widely di­
vergent staff skills. By supplementing our staff with outside evaluators 
drawn from local technical assistance providers, we developed a workable 
system. However, evaluations continued to generate discomfort among 
groups being reviewed. This process was essential both for our own in­
ternal purposes, and for die public and the city council.
Erequendy, when we went before the city council, some delegate agency
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contract was the object of council members saying “That group in my 
neighborhood isn’t doing anything.” We had to prove that they were doing 
something worthwhile. We were constantly risking being attacked tor just 
dumping money on groups for political purposes. They really wanted to 
attack us on that and make the case that this was a political operation, not a 
professional operation.
Our critics could not make their case. In four years, they could not find a 
case to demonstrate that a group we proposed to fund was not performing 
adequately. This standard required accountability from groups, and every 
year we defunded five or six groups for nonperformance. These actions 
were often protested, but we held our ground. Opposition council mem­
bers could never find a nonperforming group that we hadn’t already found 
and were planning to defund.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
which provided most of DED’s funds through the CBDG, was auditing 
DED on a case-by-case basis. They investigated every group we were sup­
porting and asked whether it met the HUD national standards. During the 
four years, HUD evaluated 100 percent of the DED projects. This close 
scrutiny created an atmosphere both within our staff and among business 
and community groups working with us that HUD was not supportive of 
what we were trying to do.
Large-Scale Development Initiatives
Several development initiatives were of such scale and importance that 
they transcended the capacity of any one department to direct. Examples 
include projects such as the renovation or replacement of professional 
sports stadiums, the construction of die new central library, the develop­
ment of new transit stations and adjacent land, and the development of 
surplus land at the city’s airports. Each of these projects involved tended to 
involve multiple departments from the development subcabinet, the city’s 
legal and financial staff, departments with specific technical respon­
sibilities like Public Works, and departments holding key assets such as 
land owned by Aviation or Public Works.
Since DED chaired the development subcabinet, and since die mayor 
wanted economic development considerations to be preeminent in diese 
projects, its top management was expected to play a part in these projects. 
In addition, the mayor had gained confidence in our individual abilities to 
respond quickly and thoroughly to projects with complex requirements. 
Over time, Mier assumed major responsibility for many of them, and their
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dictates were superimposed over the normal functions of the department.
To a degree, Mayor Washington undertook such projects reluctantly. 
They were not consistent with his development philosophy of small, widely 
dispersed projects with lots of opportunities for community involvement. 
The large projects risked activating the urban growth coalitions and having 
them again run roughshod over neighborhood interests. As Hollander also 
shows elsewhere in this volume, the mayor found he had little choice.
His first problem was that he had not been able to effectively market a 
“small is beautiful” development metaphor. This image never really took 
hold. Second, the media held him to a standard that would not have been 
placed on a white mayor. Reluctance to deliver megaprojects, the mayor 
increasingly feared, would be seen as fundamental evidence of his inability 
to govern, where it would be judged as strategic choice for a white mayor. 
Early in stadium deliberations, Washington told Mier that he believed if he 
lost a professional sports team, even to the suburbs, neither he nor any 
other black candidate for mayor could win the next election.
None of this was consolation to his community constituency, and these 
projects generated controversy. Neighborhood groups’ views about the 
correct development course were clearly defined by their own interests. 
They tended not to prioritize projects with a citywide impact or bene­
fit. Harold Washington’s track record on major projects was not their 
concern. We will illustrate diese dilemmas by means Of the stadium 
projects and the new Central Public Library, projects for which one or the 
other of us had major responsibility.
The White Sox
There were three stadium projects that surfaced during Mayor Wash­
ington’s tenure. Since the Bears and the White Sox wanted new stadiums, 
the initial efforts were focused on finding a site that could accommodate a 
new stadium complex. After some early consideration of a domed stadium, 
it became apparent that neither team wanted to play indoors or on artificial 
surfaces. Further, they had vastly different needs in terms of stadium size, 
with football seeking a 75,000-person stadium and baseball a 45,000- 
person one.
Other issues eroded the idea of a stadium complex. One team owner was 
reluctant to enter into any cooperative management arrangement with die 
other and was not confident that scheduling conflicts could be amicably 
handled. Also, the Bears wanted to own their own stadium, whereas the 
White Sox wanted a publicly built one.
By July 1986, any prospects for a stadium complex with two teams as
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tenants evaporated. The White Sox then announced that they were going 
to leave Chicago to play in west suburban Addison, 111, NftdlcSS to 59% a 
community outcry erupted.
The ensuing “Save Our Sox” campaign was dominated by community 
activists who were more baseball fans than they were connected to the 
neighborhoods around Comiskey Park. Their organizing efforts were com­
plemented by political activists seeking to build an organizational base in 
the communities adjoining the baseball park. They focused their attention 
narrowly— on keeping the White Sox in Chicago and retaining historic 
Comiskey Park. They built grass-roots support among White Sox fans. 
They did not really entertain the possibility that keeping the White Sox in 
Chicago might mean building a new stadium for them.
Importantly, we failed to expand the issue into a broad community con­
text. This was the first of the big projects with a direct community impact. 
Further, it did not really “fit” in any department. As such, the team 
appointed to negotiate with die White Sox and die state, led by Mier and 
one of die mayor’s key private sector advisors, A1 Johnson, was always try­
ing to borrow resources from departments.37 City departments responded 
by trying to minimize staff effort.
By midfall 1986, support for the White Sox in Addison had eroded, and 
in early November they lost by a close vote in a local referendum. The 
White Sox were being quietly courted by St. Petersburg, Fla., and Denver, 
Colo. With the Illinois state legislature due to convene for a brief session in 
late November, a window of opportunity for die mayor to “Save Our Sox” 
opened. He seized the opportunity.
Things moved very quickly. In a matter of forty-eight hours after 
Thanksgiving, a deal got put together that kept the White Sox in Chicago 
but called for a new stadium to be built in the vicinity erf the current Sox 
stadium. That choice was totally driven by costs— reusing existing in­
frastructure would save $ 3 0 -5 0  million. Within five working days, it was 
passed by the Illinois General Assembly. The new stadium would be fi­
nanced by rent paid by the team, supplemented with a new tax on hotel 
and motel rooms, a tax base that would not have been available for uses 
other than those seen as benefiting the “visitor industry.”
In die short run, there was widespread euphoria. After Mayor Wash­
ington’s death, much controversy erupted that warrants exposition 
elsewhere. In a nutshell, die White Sox walked away from the deal, raised 
the stakes, and forced another $150 million of public subsidy into the deal. 
Also, die Illinois Sports Facilities Authority, empowered with building the 
stadium, was accused of running roughshod over thé community and, in so 
doing, exposed the lack of community roots in the original community or­
ganizing and city plShning efforts.
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The Bears
After thé CôllapSê ôf thé stadium complex idea, tlic focus also shifted to
the Bears. Two forces shaped the direction that deliberations with the Bears 
took. The Chicago Central Area Committee (CCAC) became a strong ad­
vocate for a privately financed stadium and stood poised to organize the 
business community to purchase the luxury seating that could make such a 
venture feasible. A West Side grass-roots organization, the Midwest Com­
munity Council (MCC), organized a campaign in 1986 to bring any new 
Bears stadium to their neighborhood.
Mayor Washington was initially reluctant to consider the West Side. Al­
though there was considerable vacant land in the area being advocated by 
the MCC, there also remained a significant number erf occupied housing 
units. In late 1986, he proposed a site immediately north of existing Soldier 
Field. To complement the privately financed stadium, he proposed demoli­
tion of Soldier Field, moving parking off the Lakefront to open up the 
space, and creation of a museum complex to segregate football fans from 
visitors to the Museum of Natural History, the Aquarium, and the Plan­
etarium immediately north of Soldier Field.
His proposal was immediately scorned by Lakefront protection inter­
ests, and taken up as a major mayoral campaign issue by his opponents. 
Together, they captured the support of the Chicago Tribune, and die mayor 
reluctantly backed down. He created a site location committee with a goal 
of deflecting the issue until after the election.
We were reluctant to include the West Side site in the committee’s de­
liberations, but a strong group of organizations in that area demanded its 
consideration. In mid-1987, the committee recommended the West Side 
site. In the course of the committee’s deliberations, strong local opposition 
to the site also emerged.
The city project management team, again led by Mier and A1 Johnson, 
initiated and managed a broader community planning process around die 
proposed Bears Stadium, one that should have occurred with the Sox. We 
realized the magnitude of the relocation problem on the West Side. We en­
couraged community debate and, working with both proponents and 
opponents, facilitated a process of community dialogue. We made a con­
tinual effort to reconcile community differences.38
As the community dialogue ensued, the cost of the community demands, 
although quite reasonable, began to mount. We pledged to address the 
community needs and decided to subsidize community improvements with 
tax revenues from the luxury seating that would exist in a new stadium. We 
saw this as an opportunity to implement development policies of balanced 
growth and linkages between large and small projects.
In the end, we proposed guaranteeing any dislocated household the op­
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tion of physically moving and improving their home or building a new one 
of greater value. Further, we proposed holding them harmless for any in­
creased costs they might encounter, such as increased taxes. We proposed a 
number of community facilities, like a library and park. Most of this would 
be paid from tax revenues derived from the luxury seating.
Fate Phillips, the conservative Republican leader of the Illinois State Sen­
ate gave the best testimony on the Bears deal. He looked at it and said, 
“This deal is dangerous. If we pass this it’s going to set up a precedent that 
we can’t live with elsewhere.” After Mayor Washington’s death, the Gen­
eral Assembly rejected the deal.
The Cubs
A 1982 proposal by the Chicago Cubs had aroused a firestorm of 
controversy in the neighborhood surrounding Wrigley Field. The well- 
organized, highly educated and articulate upper-middle-income com­
munity had engineered local and state legislation prohibiting lights. In 
1984, the Cubs joined the chorus of dissident teams and proposed moving 
to the suburbs.
Mayor Washington agreed to take up the lights issue. He was partially 
motivated by a reluctance to avoid a thorny sports team issue affecting an 
upper-income white neighborhood when he was facing up to similar issues 
in poorer, largely black neighborhoods. Also, he saw the issue as a classic 
land use conflict and felt it had strong similarities to ones he faced in at­
tempting to retain industry in Chicago.
He directed that an open, public process be undertaken to find a way to 
partially accommodate the Cubs, enough to make it difficult for them to 
leave the city. The process consisted of creating a negotiating committee 
comprising neighborhood residents, business leaders, and the Cubs. Their 
meetings were professionally facilitated, supported by considerable infor­
mation gathering including the use of survey sampling, and a number of 
community meetings. A compromise resulted, hammered out over an al­
most two-year period, which placed severe limitations on the number of 
night games (eighteen) and which specified starting times, a curfew for al­
cohol sales, and stringent neighborhood parking restrictions. By all 
accounts, including those of the main “no lights” advocates, the solution 
has worked quite well.
Central Public Library
The possibility of a new Central Public Library was another such large 
public development. This was a project that had been on the agendas of at
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least two previous mayors. Byrne’s approach had been to put die new facil­
ity in a renovated department store on State Street— Goldblatt’s. The site 
was subject to intense controversy, and the issue of die library project 
moved on to the mayor’s large project development agenda by late 1985, 
around the time Moe moved back to die Mayor’s Office. In a series of “ mid­
course correction” meetings during this time to critically assess what 
essential work was yet to be done, the central library emerged as a priority 
for three of the five subcabinets. This was largely due to the realization that 
the Washington administration had to demonstrate its capacity to effec­
tively implement large-scale development projects. This was against the 
background of the administration’s rejection of the World’s Fair and in­
ability to move the Navy Pier project in the face of opposition by the dty 
council’s opposition majority.
Because of the time pressure to deliver this project and in light of the con­
troversy surrounding cost overruns at such other projects as the State of 
Illinois Center and at McCormick Place, the mayor was searching for an 
approach that would deliver this project on time and within the budget. It 
was also more subtle: we all understood the way large projects were done 
to enhance the functioning of traditional development networks, with 
featherbedding of consultant costs, inflated change orders, etc. We wanted 
to change this process. There was also a desire to change the process in a 
different way, by including a greater degree of public involvement.
The mayor established a Central Library Advisory Committee to 
counsel him on the specifics of the development approach, in particular, 
completing the library as “design-build” project. Using this technique, 
which Hollander describes in more detail later in this volume, bids would 
be solicited to design and build the library within a specific cost. The devel­
oper would be selected based on both design and cost criteria. And 
significantly, the developer would be selected by a committee following ex­
tensive public debate on the designs themselves. In this case the designs of 
the competing teams were on display at the Cultural Center and were the 
subject of extensive public hearings.
This approach was a fundamentally important departure from tradi­
tional approaches to development of such projects, not only in Chicago but 1
in the nation. In choosing the design-build approach, the mayor clearly un- f
derstood that he was authorizing a procedure that was completely ]
insulated from political influence in the development process, even influ- j
ence that might work to his advantage. I
The process worked beyond our imagination. Thirty thousand people j 
viewed the design entries at the Cultural Center. In effect a constituency for 
the new Central Public Library was developed through the process. Con­
struction began in 1988. j
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Assessment o f Large Projects
Our involvement with large scale projects convinces us that it is both 
necessary and possible for a progressive local government to undertake 
them. To a degree, community attitudes toward large projects have 
been conditioned by decades-old “downtown vs. the neighborhoods’* 
community-organizing emphases. These emphases were given teeth by the 
paternalistic tendency of old-fashioned politics, exemplified by die hand­
ling of the World’s Fair by the Byrne administration, to treat large projects 
as too important to involve common people.
But by 1987, the large-scale projects were being undertaken as if com­
munity people mattered. The Central Public Library, fittingly named for 
the mayor after his death, may best exemplify this change in attitude. 
People throughout the city seem to claim ownership and, through it, can 
see a public interest that transcends local, community interests. Finally, 
this public interest had been given teeth during the tenures of Mayors 
Washington and Sawyer by tight fiscal management and vigorous pursuit 
through contracting and purchasing of equal opportunity goals.
Conclusion: What Did We Accomplish?
An action-based view of planning requires ongoing self criticism. During 
1983-1987 , we continually assessed what we were doing, and we would 
like to share some of our observations.
On the whole we are comfortable in saying that we achieved a lot of what 
we set out to do. This included substantial work with and in neighbor­
hoods, most involving concrete projects: facilitating community-based 
development, helping smaller businesses, and encouraging housing con­
struction and rehabilitation. We also made headway on the large 
projects— Southwest Rapid Transit, the stadium deals, and the Central 
Public Library— but believe we undertook them in ways to make them less 
onerous to neighborhood people.
We emerged from our experience with a powerful sense of the impor­
tance of basic service delivery. Despite our emphasis on process and 
planning, we spent the majority of our time trying to deliver projects and 
programs. Yet, in thinking about accomplishments, it is important to re­
flect again on the environment within which we were working. Harold 
Washington took office in the trough of the 1981-1983  recession, and the 
so-called Reagan recovery was slow to reach Chicago. Unlike previous
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Chicago mayors, he did not enjoy the confidence and support of the Demo­
cratic political establishment at either the national or local level. In a 
pattern quite dissimilar to that of other cities undertaking government 
management reform, he received only limited business community support 
until after the 1986 special aldermanic elections that gave him control over 
the city council. Finally, he inherited a bureaucracy dominated by political 
appointees of his local opposition who hardly saw it in their interest for 
Harold Washington to succeed.
We came to appreciate that the structure of local power was more com­
plex than we realized in 1983. The entrenched machine die mayor sought 
to dissolve had substantial influence, if not outright control, over most of 
the major local public and private institutions. These included die sister 
local governments: the Housing Authority, the Transit Authority, the city 
colleges, the Board of Education, and the Park District. The machine’s in­
fluence reached deep into major financial and legal establishments, the 
unions, and even the Catholic church. In fact, the metaphor of a machine is 
quite misleading. A machine operates in a consistent and predictable way. 
A weed, with its ever-spreading roots and tenacity, is a better metaphor.
The idea of a “power elite” had always been abstract to us, but our 
experience in government brought it to life. In Chicago, it is not a small, 
tightly knit club, but a large, multilayered, informal network bound to­
gether by corporatist ideology. It was an ideology that had a difficult time 
accommodating die notion of a strong black mayor.
In addition to diese obstacles, Mayor Washington faced enormous fiscal 
constraints. He inherited a $168 million current operating deficit, and in 
his first term saw federal revenue sharing decrease by a total of almost $200 
million. He found litde slack in the local budget, with almost 70 percent of 
the resources committed to provision of police, fire, and sanitation ser­
vices. These areas of increasing public demand for expansion were virtually 
immune to efficiency improvements.39
In light of these realities, Mayor Washington had to reach beyond usual 
constituencies for support and encouragement. He found it both in the 
base that elected him and in some new places. Within the base, the black 
churches and black talk radio continued to provide important forums to 
exchange ideas and solicit support.40 Within the white community, civic 
groups like the League of Women Voters afforded him the respect they tra­
ditionally showed all Chicago mayors. Within the Hispanic community, 
local business groups became important connecting points. Across all 
parts of the city, community-based organizations played a crucial support 
role, including areas of the city, like the Northwest and Southwest Sides, 
which had voted overwhelmingly against Washington in 1983. Given the 
historical connection between the community development movement and
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Washington's election, community-based organizations became an essen­
tial constituency supporting the mayor's development agenda.
From the perspective of efforts within government at policy and program 
development and implementation, support of community-based organiza­
tions was a powerful countervailing force with which the mayor could face 
entrenched political or bureaucratic interests. In some cases, the quality of 
die support was so rich that die mayor could move boldly. Examples 
include the Playskool suit, the shutdown of Community Development- 
funded departments in 1985, and pursuit of Planned Manufacturing 
District designation.
We constantly were aware of the fragility of relations with community- 
based organizations: many of our staff felt them to be alien and hostile, and 
die community organizations themselves were walking fine lines between 
being helpful and feeling co-opted. This led to a growing frustration on 
their part. The large-scale projects placed a particular strain on the rela­
tionship. Nonetheless, the continued capacity development of community- 
based organizations and their sophistication at agenda setting may be one 
important legacy of the Washington years.41
With the backing of community-based organizations, we were able to do 
many things differently. Most important among them was to attack dis­
crimination and to vigorously pursue equal opportunity programs. For 
example, in the ten years prior to Washington taking office, die Depart­
ment of Economic Development and its predecessor, the Economic 
Development Commission, had concluded nine financial deals involving 
minority firms; within three years of Harold Washington’s inauguration, 
we concluded sixty.
This achievement had multiple roots. Most important were the develop­
ment of a small business lending program, which previously the city didn’t 
have, and the recruitment of black and Hispanic professionals to the staff so 
applicants could talk to people more understanding of their situation. 
With these and comparable accomplishments, we believe we significantly 
changed the nature and distribution of the outcomes of government devel­
opment efforts.
Our initial expectation that local government could play an substantial 
role in illuminating issues was borne out. It had capacity to focus attention, 
shape debate, endorse or invent language, and influence forums. In the 
context of promoting participatory decision making, this is a powerful 
conception of planning’s role.42
Only history will judge whether the changes we implemented will stand 
the test of time. Certainly we were aware that a progressive local govern­
ment in Chicago would likely be temporary, and we constantly tried to 
institutionalize oufprogress. Three means stand out. First, we recruited
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talented and politically progressive people into the bureaucracy. Many of 
them are still there, we’re glad to note. Second, we tried to fix with tradition 
and law means of opening up government information to ordinary citizens. 
An example is the Freedom of Information executive order. Finally, by 
bringing all interested parties to the tables of discussion and debate, we 
hoped to build both capacity and expectation in citizens to participate in 
government decision making. Harold Washington was a great believer in 
democracy, and these means were vital to him. Ultimately, their stability 
and significance, we believe, will hinge on the state of race relations in 
Chicago.
We came away with a humbling sense of the enormity of the issues of 
poverty and race. Poverty seems an overwhelming issue. Partially, we feel 
this because we had little chance to address it without control of vital ser­
vice institutions like the schools and the Housing Authority. In Chicago, 
the racial issue is possibly even more intractable. Because poverty and race 
are so intertwined in this society, the inability to deal with race is a major 
cause of the inability to deal with poverty.
We hope that our enthusiasm and commitment has come through on 
these pages. What is probably less clear is the raw intensity of the effort 
demanded. For example, the amount of time and effort necessary to effect 
public dialogue across races and classes while also managing a large public 
bureaucracy is almost beyond description. We found ourselves working 
some 80—100 hours a week, year in, year out; Harold Washington seldom 
put in less than a 120-hour workweek. We found a constant need to net­
work with reform-minded individuals outside government to check our 
progress, solicit new ideas, and gamer support. Like the mayor, we liber­
ally handed out our office and home phone numbers to everyone who 
wanted to share an opinion, favorable or otherwise, about our progress. 
We constantly struggled to find language and metaphors, like die develop­
ment logo “Chicago Works Together,” that could ease our work in a 
multirace, multiclass development environment.
In die flush of election victory, we joined the Washington administration 
believing a lot of the hard work had been done. We felt that relative to die 
demands of implementing an agenda, the hard tasks had been policy plan­
ning, program development, and political mobilization. Our priorities are 
now reversed: we believe that organizational development and program 
implementation is the most difficult job.
But we have faith and remain inspired by our great mentor, Harold 
Washington. Shortly before his death, in his annual State of the City ad­
dress to the League of Women Voters, he said in reflecting on his 
accomplishments:
In years past, through some of the healthiest and happiest periods in
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our country’s life, there was an active federal-urban partnership that 
flourished and nourished not only our tiÛÇS, but the suburbs around 
them. But the spirit of those bright days has been eclipsed by a new 
ethic of sink-or-swim, a mean-spirited myopia that can focus only on 
the bottom line, blind to the crisis we are creating at our lowest income 
levels— or the growing sense of dread among those with fixed 
incomes— or the creeping anxieties of our middle classes.
We must counter that specter of despair with the New Spirit of 
Chicago. We have proven to ourselves that change is possible in our 
own city. And we have taken the national leadership among cities, in 
working for change in Washington, D.C. The federal budget is our 
business. Our country’s foreign trade policy is our business. Our 
country’s economic policy is our business. Every policy that affects 
jobs, education, housing, is our business. We have a direct interest in 
federal policies toward the poor, the homeless, the aging, the disabled, 
mothers and children, and all those others who have been thrown at 
our doorstep by a federal administration in retreat from reality.
And so I ask for your hand and for your voice. Lend a hand to help 
your dty, in our efforts to “do for ourselves.” And let your voice be 
heard as we make our case at the federal level, where the responsibility 
for our cities must ultimately lie. Working together, we can build on 
the progress of the past four years, to meet challenges of the years 
ahead.43
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